

WEEKLY BULLETIN

Communicable Disease Threats Report

Week 28, 4 – 10 July 2026

This week's topics

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Executive summary

Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus – Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda – 2026

- As of 9 July 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reported a total of 1 792 confirmed cases and 625 confirmed related deaths (based on data until 8 July). Since the beginning of the outbreak to date, 37/104 health zones in three provinces (Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu) have been affected.
- In Uganda, no new cases have been reported since 21 June 2026. The country has reported a total of 20 confirmed cases, including two deaths.
- On the basis of the available information, and given the uncertainties surrounding this outbreak, the likelihood of infection for people from the EU/EEA living in or travelling to affected areas is estimated to be low. Given the very low likelihood of importation and secondary transmission, the likelihood of infection for people living in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) is estimated to be very low. This assessment will be reviewed as further information becomes available.
- ECDC is monitoring the outbreak through epidemic intelligence activities and actively liaising with partners to support the response.

Avian influenza A(H9N2) – Multi-country (World) – Monitoring human cases

- One new human case of avian influenza A(H9N2) was reported in the Guangdong Province in China.
- The case involves a child with disease onset on 12 June 2026.
- The risk related to zoonotic influenza (due to A(H9N2) viruses) for the general population in the EU/EEA is currently considered very low.

Overview of respiratory virus epidemiology in the EU/EEA, week 27, 2026

Important: This ERVISS publication follows the recent transition of reporting surveillance data from The European Surveillance System (TESSy) to EpiPulse Cases (EPC). As a result of this transition, we have identified a few data inconsistencies. We are actively working with individual countries to resolve these and any other issue that may arise to ensure high data quality. **During this period, data updates to the GitHub repository will be paused.** Thank you for your patience and understanding.

Summary

Respiratory virus activity across EU/EEA countries remains at baseline levels, indicating limited respiratory virus circulation.

SARS-CoV-2 activity is low in all age groups in primary and secondary care.

Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) activity is low, at inter-seasonal levels.

Influenza virus activity is low, at inter-seasonal levels.

This week's [EuroMOMO](#) pooled estimates of **all-cause mortality** for the participating 27 European countries show increased mortality around week 26, 2026. This increase is mainly seen in age groups above 45 years and is affecting some countries.

All data are provisional and may be affected by reporting delays, incomplete country data or low testing volumes. A few countries with high testing rates can disproportionately influence pooled data. Further information is available under 'Country notes' and 'Additional resources'.

Seasonal surveillance of West Nile Virus infections – 2026 (Weekly report)

Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as of 8 July, 11 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in five countries across Europe. These areas are located in Italy (five), North Macedonia (two), Romania (two), Greece (one) and Spain (one).

Seasonal surveillance of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever - 2026 (Weekly report)

- Since the beginning of 2026, and as of 8 July 2026, one country in Europe has reported locally acquired cases of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF): Spain (one case).

Seasonal monitoring of environmental suitability for *Vibrio* spp. risk in coastal waters - Bathing season 2026

- Vibriosis is caused by naturally occurring *Vibrio* bacteria found in coastal waters, particularly warm, brackish environments. In Europe, *Vibrio* bacteria are most frequently detected during the summer season, with the Baltic Sea being particularly favourable due to its low salinity levels.
- A warmer climate is expected to increase the suitability of coastal areas for *Vibrio* growth and expansion.
- The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) monitors environmental suitability for *Vibrio* growth in EU/EEA coastal waters and publishes regular updates through the [Vibrio Viewer](#) and the [Communicable Disease Threat Reports](#) to assess and communicate the potential risk to human health across the EU/EEA.

Expert deployment

- Since 19 May 2026, the EU Health Task Force (EUHTF) has been deploying experts to support preparedness and response efforts related to the Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda.
- Five experts have been deployed on a rotating basis to support Africa CDC, initially at its headquarters in Addis Ababa and, since 23 June, within the Continental Incident Management Support Team (IMST) in Uganda. These deployments are part of the project 'Health Security and One Health in Africa - Africa CDC' in partnership with ECDC and EFSA (PHASE II) and funded by the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA).
- Between 15 and 22 June, the EUHTF deployed a team of three ECDC experts and two Member State experts to Kinshasa (DRC) and Kampala (Uganda), to conduct a Point of Entry fact-finding mission.
- Between 16 June and 8 July, an ECDC Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) expert was deployed to the WHO country office in Juba, South Sudan, in response to a Global Outbreak Alert and Responses Network request for assistance, to support community engagement activities and address key RCCE gaps in high-risk areas.
- These activities are being conducted in close coordination with national authorities and the EU delegations and in collaboration with the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) and DG INTPA.

1. Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus – Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda – 2026

Latest epidemiological information

Democratic Republic of the Congo

On 9 July 2026, the [Democratic Republic of the Congo \(DRC\) reported](#) a total of 1 792 confirmed cases, including 625 related deaths (from data up until 8 July). A total of 764 patients are hospitalised in isolation. This represents an increase of 33 new confirmed cases and 25 related deaths. The new cases have been reported from Ituri and North Kivu. Two cases have been reported in Kisingani (Tshopo province, which neighbours Ituri), one of which has links to Ituri. These cases are not included in the totals as investigations are ongoing. Among the individuals that tested positive for Bundibugyo virus, 295 have recovered. In total 78.6% of identified case contacts are under follow-up in the Ituri and North Kivu provinces.

Among the confirmed cases in DRC, Ituri province remains the most affected, with 1 631 cases, including 535 deaths, reported from 25 of 36 health zones. In North Kivu, 158 cases, including 89 deaths, have been reported from 11 of 34 health zones. In South Kivu, three cases, including one death, have been reported from one of 34 health zones. Overall, 37 of 104 health zones are currently affected across the three provinces.

Uganda

As of 9 July 2026, a total of 20 confirmed cases, including two deaths, have been [reported by the Ministry of Health](#) in Uganda. The last confirmed case was reported on 21 June and no new cases have been reported since then. Sixteen individuals have recovered. Overall, 831 all-time contacts have been identified, and 821 of these individuals have completed the 21-day follow-up.

Among the confirmed cases, 15 had travel links to DRC and five were associated with local transmission events.

Summary

On 15 May 2026, Africa CDC reported an outbreak of Ebola disease in Ituri Province, DRC ([Africa CDC Calls Urgent Regional Coordination Meeting Following Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak in Ituri, 15 May 2026](#), [Africa CDC Special Briefing on Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak Status, 16 May 2026](#)). Laboratory analysis at the Institut National de Recherche Biomedicale of DRC identified Bundibugyo virus ([Democratic Republic of the Congo confirms new Ebola outbreak, WHO scales up support | WHO AFRO, 15 May 2026](#)).

Clusters of community deaths have been reported, including deaths among healthcare workers in DRC ([Epidemic of Ebola Disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda determined a public health emergency of international concern, 17 May 2026](#), [Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo \(The\) & Uganda](#)).

The Ministry of Health of DRC reported that the index case was a nurse (age unknown) who died in a healthcare facility in Bunia (capital of Ituri Province). The case presented with fever, bleeding, vomiting and weakness ([Ministère de la Santé RDC Declaration of Ebola Outbreak 15 May 2025](#)). However, the outbreak is likely to have started many weeks before, given the number of cases and the geographical spread.

On 18 May 2026, a US citizen working in healthcare in the affected areas tested positive and was transferred to Germany, together with six high-risk contacts ([US CDC Update on Ebola Outbreak, 18 May 2026](#), [Serge News and Updates, 18 May 2026](#)). The American doctor subsequently recovered well and was discharged from the hospital in Berlin, where he was treated ([Ebola patient discharged from Charite hospital in Berlin in good health, 6 June 2026](#)). Another contact of US nationality was transferred to Czechia ([US CDC Transcript -19 May 2026](#)). On 24 June, the [Ministry of Health in France reported](#) a first positive case of Ebola virus disease, identified in a doctor returning from a humanitarian mission in one of the areas affected by the ongoing outbreak in DRC.

The first case reported in Uganda was travel-related and the patient later died ([Democratic Republic of the Congo confirms new Ebola outbreak, WHO scales up support | WHO AFRO, 15 May 2026](#), [Epidemic of Ebola Disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda determined a public health emergency of international concern, 17 May 2026](#)). Health authorities [reported](#) that 15 confirmed cases in Uganda had travel links to DRC. Additional cases were identified following [contact tracing activities](#). Uganda postponed a

large religious event (Martyr's Day) that normally takes place on 3 June and has also suspended cross-border transport activities (Government of Uganda on X: 21 May 2025).

Genomes from DRC and Uganda have been published and preliminary analysis shows sequences distinct from the previous outbreaks ([Virological Ebola virus/Bundibugyo ebolavirus, 18 May 2026](#)).

Information regarding transmission chains and affected population groups is currently limited, partly due to the complex context of insecurity and humanitarian challenges in the affected areas. According to WHO, neighbouring countries sharing land borders with DRC are considered at high risk of further spread due to population mobility, trade and travel links, and uncertainty about the transmission chains. The outbreak may also be larger than currently detected. There are also concerns related to this outbreak because it is caused by Bundibugyo virus, rather than the more commonly detected Orthoebolavirus zairense. Unlike Orthoebolavirus zairense, there are currently no licenced vaccines or specific treatments for Bundibugyo virus disease.

Given the information available, the complicated context and the uncertainties regarding epidemiological information, WHO declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 17 May 2026 ([Epidemic of Ebola Disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda determined a public health emergency of international concern, 17 May 2026](#)). On 18 May 2026, Africa CDC declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security ([Africa CDC Declares the Ongoing Bundibugyo Ebola Outbreak a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security – Africa CDC, 18 May 2026](#)). On 5 June, WHO and Africa CDC launched a [joint continental preparedness and response plan](#) to support African countries in the response to the ongoing outbreak.

This is the 17th Ebola disease outbreak reported in DRC. The most recent prior outbreak occurred in 2025 in Kasai Province due to Ebola virus Orthoebolavirus zairense ([WHO DON Ebola virus disease – Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5 September 2025](#)). In Ituri province specifically, Ebola disease due to Ebola virus Orthoebolavirus zairense was last documented during the 2018–2020 outbreak. This outbreak was declared on 1 August 2018 following reports of laboratory-confirmed cases in North Kivu province. Investigations identified cases in Ituri and North Kivu with symptom onset from May 2018. The outbreak also spread to South Kivu. Between 1 August 2018 and 25 June 2020, when the outbreak was declared over, a total of 3 470 cases were reported, including 3 317 confirmed and 153 probable cases. At the time, WHO declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern ([Disease Outbreak News Ebola virus disease – Democratic Republic of the Congo, 26 June 2020, Medical countermeasures during the 2018 Ebola virus disease outbreak in the North Kivu and Ituri Provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: a rapid genomic assessment - ScienceDirect](#)).

Bundibugyo virus was first reported in 2007 in Bundibugyo district in Uganda, during an outbreak. The most recent outbreak due to Bundibugyo virus was in 2012 in DRC ([Uganda: Ebola outbreak press statement - 20 Dec 2007 - Uganda | ReliefWeb, WHO | Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo, 12 August 2012](#)).

On 1 June 2026, a case was reported by Uganda as having had a travel history to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), arriving on 24 May ([Media reports on 1 June 2026, WHO media briefing on 3 June 2026, WHO DON 8 June 2026](#)). [According to WHO, as of 8 June](#), no cases of Ebola disease have been reported in the UAE. Public health measures, including risk assessment activities, contact tracing and follow-up, and strengthened preparedness at points of entry, have been implemented in coordination with WHO, UAE and international partners.

Travel restrictions

Enhanced control and screening protocols have been activated by authorities in several countries to limit the risk of viral spread.

Exit screening has been implemented in DRC, Uganda and South Sudan. In [DRC](#), points of entry (PoE) and points of control (PoC) have been activated at key locations, including airports, road checkpoints and towns or local transit points, such as Nizi and [Irumu](#) (Ituri), Mudzibala (Bunia), Dele and Chai (Rwampara). Bunia airport in the Ituri province was [temporarily closed on 23 May](#) and [re-opened on 2 June with the implementation of health screening measures](#). Commercial flights to and from Bunia airport were temporarily [suspended again as of 6 June](#), as part of health security arrangements in response to the Ebola disease outbreak, according to the [media](#).

Uganda's Ministry of Health announced on 15 June 2026 ([press release](#)) that the general public, travellers, recruitment agencies, travel agents, and all stakeholders departing from Uganda do not require an 'Ebola-Free Certificate'. The 'Ebola-Free Certificate' is not a requirement for visa applications to any country. Ebola testing is recommended for symptomatic individuals who develop symptoms consistent with Ebola virus disease, or those who are identified as contacts of confirmed Ebola virus disease cases, based on a clinical and epidemiological assessment by health authorities.

Rwanda's Ministry of Health has reinforced health screening and vigilance at land points of entry along the border with DRC. Enhanced entry control measures have been implemented at Kigali International Airport for inbound travellers to Rwanda ([Rwanda Ministry of Health, 22 May on X](#)).

Several countries have also implemented entry restrictions and health screening for individuals travelling from high-risk countries, including the [US](#), [Canada](#), [Tunisia](#), [Thailand](#), [Mauritius](#) and [the Bahamas](#) ([Ebola Update - Travel Measures and Ongoing Monitoring](#)).

On 24 June, as part of the response to the ongoing outbreak, the [Ministry of Health in DRC issued a decree](#) enforcing the following measures: contacts of confirmed or probable cases face 21-day active self-monitoring and restrictions on both domestic and international movement. Healthcare and response workers returning from affected areas are subject to similar rules, although active monitoring is not explicitly specified and domestic travel remains permitted. Anyone who has stayed in an affected province cannot travel internationally for 21 days (the decree does not address any obligations for actual cases.) In addition, outbound international travellers are required to complete a mandatory health declaration form issued by border health authorities.

ECDC assessment

Given the gaps in epidemiological information and limited follow-up of contacts, it is likely that the outbreak is larger than is currently being reported in terms of the number of affected cases.

Given all the available information and uncertainties surrounding this outbreak, the likelihood of infection for people from the EU/EEA living in or travelling to affected areas is estimated to be low. Given the very low likelihood of importation and secondary transmission, the likelihood of infection is estimated to be very low for people living in the EU/EEA. The overall risk of Bundibugyo virus transmission through substances of human origin (SoHO) in the EU/EEA is currently assessed as very low ([Risk of Bundibugyo virus transmission through substances of human origin in the European Union/European Economic Area \(EU/EEA\)](#)). This assessment will be reviewed as further information becomes available.

Exit screening in affected countries, including symptom checks and exposure assessment, is important as it contributes to risk reduction by identifying symptomatic travellers before they board flights, to prevent them travelling while symptomatic. Exit screening also helps dissuade people with symptoms from travelling and enhances public and stakeholder confidence. However, it cannot fully prevent exportation of cases, because the absence of symptoms at departure does not exclude subsequent onset of disease.

ECDC considers that screening of returning travellers from affected areas (DRC, Uganda) would not be effective in preventing introduction to Europe. This consideration is based on the lessons learned and results of the large EVD outbreak in West Africa between 2013 and 2016, where tens of thousands of cases were reported, transmission was ongoing in large urban centres, and hundreds of EU/EEA humanitarian and military personnel were deployed to the affected areas. Screening incoming travellers is time- and resource-consuming and will not effectively identify people with the infection. Priority should instead be given to providing travellers with clear information on symptoms, routes of transmission, and what to do if symptoms develop after arrival in the EU/EEA.

Detailed assessment of the event can be found in ECDC's Threat Assessment Brief published on 21 May 2026 ([Threat assessment brief: Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus – Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda – 2026](#)).

Actions

ECDC continues to monitor the outbreak through its epidemic intelligence activities to provide epidemiological updates, situational awareness and risk assessment for the EU/EEA.

Since 19 May 2026, the EU Health Task Force, in collaboration with DG ECHO, DG INTPA and GOARN, has been deploying ECDC experts to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in Africa CDC headquarters, and Kampala (Uganda).


ECDC is actively liaising with key partners, including Africa CDC, the European Commission, and WHO to provide further support through the EU Health Task Force in response to this outbreak.

ECDC is regularly re-evaluating the situation as new information becomes available and continues to provide updated epidemiological information, scientific assessments and advice on its website [Ebola disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda](#).

Last time this event was included in the Weekly CDTR: 3 July 2026.

Maps and graphs

Figure 1. Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus – Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda - 2026 - Map of the affected areas



Map produced by ECDC on: 10/07/2026. Administrative data ©UNFPA ©UNODC-HA; Road, cities and airport ©OSM. The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the European Union.

Source: ECDC

2. Avian influenza A(H9N2) – Multi-country (World) – Monitoring human cases

Overview

Summary

One human case of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus infection was reported in China according to the [Avian Influenza Report \(Volume 22, Number 27\)](#) published on 7 July 2026 by the Hong Kong Centre for Health Protection.

The case involves a one-year-old girl in China (Guangdong Province) who developed symptoms on 12 June 2026. The case was confirmed to have been infected with avian influenza A(H9N2).

A previous confirmed case of avian influenza A(H9N2) was reported in the same province with symptom onset on February 2026. A total of 13 cases (including the one in this report) involving human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus have been reported in China in the last six months.

ECDC assessment

Sporadic human infections with avian influenza A(H9N2) have been observed outside of the EU/EEA. One case has also been reported in the EU/EEA, with exposure history during travel outside of Europe. Direct contact with infected birds or contaminated environments is the most likely source of human infection with avian influenza viruses. In most cases, influenza A(H9N2) leads to mild clinical illness. To date, no clusters of human A(H9N2) infection have been reported. There is no evidence that the virus has acquired the ability for sustained transmission among humans. The risk related to zoonotic influenza (due to A(H9N2) viruses) for the general population in the EU/EEA is currently considered very low.

Actions

ECDC monitors avian influenza strains through its epidemic intelligence and disease network activities. Together with the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the EU Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, ECDC produces a [quarterly report on the avian influenza situation](#). The most recent report was published in June 2026.

Sources: [Event Information Site for IHR National Focal Points](#)

Last time this event was included in the Weekly CDTR: 3 July 2026.

3. Overview of respiratory virus epidemiology in the EU/EEA, week 27, 2026

Overview

ECDC monitors respiratory illness rates and virus activity across the EU/EEA. Findings are presented in the European Respiratory Virus Surveillance Summary ([ERVISS.org](https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/eriss)), which is updated weekly.


Key visualisation from the weekly bulletin are included below.

Sources: [ERVISS](https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/eriss)

Last time this event was included in the Weekly CDTR: 3 July 2026.


Maps and graphs

Figure 1. ILI/ARI virological surveillance in primary care - weekly test positivity



Source: ECDC

Figure 2. SARI virological surveillance in hospitals - weekly test positivity



Source: ECDC

Figure 3. Key indicators

Indicator	Syndrome or pathogen	Reporting countries		EU/EEA summary	
		Week 27	Week 26	Description	Value
ILI/ARI consultation rates in primary care	ARI	10 rates (6 MEM)	11 rates (6 MEM)	Distribution of country MEM categories	6 Baseline
	ILI	12 rates (11 MEM)	12 rates (11 MEM)		10 Baseline 1 Low
ILI/ARI test positivity in primary care	Influenza	12	14	Pooled (median; IQR)	0% (0; 0–0%)
	RSV	11	13		0.3% (0; 0–0%)
	SARS-CoV-2	11	13		1.9% (0; 0–0.6%)
SARI rates in hospitals	SARI	8 rates (4 MEM)	10 rates (5 MEM)	Distribution of country MEM categories	4 Baseline
SARI test positivity in hospitals	Influenza	6	8	Pooled (median; IQR)	0.3% (0; 0–0.3%)
	RSV	6	7		0.5% (0; 0–5.4%)
	SARS-CoV-2	6	7		0.6% (0; 0–1.4%)
Intensity (country-defined)	Influenza	7	10	Distribution of country qualitative categories	7 Baseline

Source: ECDC

Figure 4. ILI/ARI virological surveillance in primary care - pathogen type and subtype distribution

Pathogen	Week 27, 2026		Week 40, 2025 – week 27, 2026	
	N	% ^a	N	% ^a
Influenza	0	–	17603	–
Influenza A	0	–	17003	99
A(H1)pdm09	0	–	3938	28
A(H3)	0	–	10091	72
A (unknown)	0	–	2974	–
Influenza B	0	–	119	0.7
B/Vic	0	–	35	100
B (unknown)	0	–	84	–
Influenza untyped	0	–	481	–
RSV	1	–	5176	–
RSV-A	0	0.0	823	42
RSV-B	1	100	1131	58
RSV untyped	0	–	3222	–
SARS-CoV-2	7	–	3995	–

Source: ECDC

Figure 5. SARI virological surveillance in hospitals - pathogen type and subtype distribution

Pathogen	Week 27, 2026		Week 40, 2025 – week 27, 2026	
	N	% ^a	N	% ^a
Influenza	2	–	15687	–
Influenza A	1	100	7589	99
A(H1)pdm09	1	100	1307	35
A(H3)	0	0.0	2414	65
A (unknown)	0	–	3868	–
Influenza B	0	0.0	68	0.9
B/Vic			10	100
B (unknown)	0	–	58	–
Influenza untyped	1	–	8030	–
RSV	3	–	7185	–
RSV-A			1149	52
RSV-B			1058	48
RSV untyped	3	–	4978	–
SARS-CoV-2	4	–	3018	–

Source: ECDC

Figure 6. Genetically characterised influenza virus distribution, week 40, 2025 – week 27, 2026

Subtype distribution			Subclade distribution		
Subtype	N	%	Subclade	N	%
A(H1)pdm09	3502	39	5a.2a.1(D.3.1)	3396	97
			5a.2a.1(D)	97	3
			5a.2a(C.1.9.3)	9	0.3
A(H3)	5442	60	2a.3a.1(K)	4825	89
			2a.3a.1(J.2)	320	6
			2a.3a.1(J.2.4)	240	4
			2a.3a.1(J.2.2)	31	0.6
			2a.3a.1(J)	25	0.5
			2a.3a.1(J.2.5)	1	0
B/Vic	106	1	V1A.3a.2(C.5.6)	38	36
			V1A.3a.2(C.5.1)	21	20
			V1A.3a.2(C.5.6)	20	19
			V1A.3a.2(C.3.1)	13	12
			V1A.3a.2(C.5.7)	12	11
			V1A.3a.2(C.5)	2	2

Source: ECDC

4. Seasonal surveillance of West Nile Virus infections – 2026 (Weekly report)

Overview

Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as of 8 July, 11 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in five countries across Europe.

These areas are located in Italy (five), North Macedonia (two), Romania (two), Greece (one) and Spain (one).

The report is available [online](#).

Throughout the season, ECDC will publish a [weekly report](#) with updates on risk areas for locally acquired WNV infections. A [monthly report](#) will also be published.

WNV infection in humans is a notifiable disease at EU level and cases should be reported by national public health authorities through the EpiPulse Cases platform according to the [EU case definition](#). According to Commission Directives [2004/33/EC](#) and [2014/110/EU](#) on blood safety, blood establishments in EU/EEA countries should apply temporary deferral criteria for donors of allogeneic blood donation for 28 days after they have left a risk area for locally acquired WNV, unless an individual nucleic acid test (NAT) is negative. WNV surveillance activities carried out by ECDC support the competent authorities responsible for blood safety in the implementation of these directives.

ECDC assessment

Seasonal weather conditions are currently favourable for mosquito-borne transmission, therefore more cases are expected to occur in the coming weeks.

Actions

ECDC will provide weekly and monthly updates with the latest reports on cases of WNV infections in Europe. A map and table will be updated every Friday from now until November, as this is the time of year when WNV infections are most likely to be reported.

ECDC will provide an enhanced analysis of the current WNV epidemiology on a monthly basis together with the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which includes the number of locally acquired human cases reported, outbreaks of West Nile fever in equids and birds notified to the Animal Disease Information System (ADIS) of the European Commission, and an assessment of the situation.

Last time this event was included in the Weekly CDTR: 3 July 2026.

5. Seasonal surveillance of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever - 2026 (Weekly report)

Overview

Since the beginning of 2026 and as of 8 July 2026, one country in Europe has reported locally acquired cases of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF): Spain (one case).

The report is available [online](#).

ECDC assessment

The case in Salamanca (Spain) is not unexpected as *Hyalomma* spp. – the main vector of CCHF virus – are widely distributed across the region. In addition, CCHF virus is known to circulate in local animal populations, and human cases have previously been reported there. The timing of this case aligns with the expected seasonal pattern of CCHF in Spain, and is probably linked to increased tick activity.

Although the risk of contracting CCHF for the general population in the areas where the virus is known to be present in Spain is low, this risk increases for people undertaking outside activities that expose them to tick bites (e.g. hunting, forestry work, hiking, animal surveillance). As a general precaution against CCHF, but also against other tick-borne diseases, people who may potentially be exposed to ticks should apply personal protective measures ([ECDC Protective Measures against ticks](#)). In Spain, CCHF virus is transmitted to humans mainly by ticks of the genus *Hyalomma*. While *Hyalomma lusitanicum* plays a key role in virus maintenance and transmission dynamics, *Hyalomma marginatum* is generally considered to be the principal species involved in transmission to humans. *Hyalomma marginatum* is widely [present in southern and eastern Europe](#) and *Hyalomma lusitanicum* is [present in parts of southern Europe](#).

More information on CCHF can be found in ECDC's [factsheet](#). In December 2023, ECDC published a [report](#) on the spatial distribution of CCHF based on predicted ecological suitability.

Actions

ECDC will continue to monitor the situation and will publish a weekly report on the occurrence of CCHF in the EU/EEA until November 2026.

Last time this event was included in the Weekly CDTR: 3 July 2026.

6. Seasonal monitoring of environmental suitability for *Vibrio* spp. risk in coastal waters - Bathing season 2026

Update

A list of areas expected to have high environmental suitability* for *Vibrio* spp. in the next five days (until 15 July 2026) is provided below, based on forecasts from the [Vibrio Viewer](#).

For the period in question, a total of 276 unique Local Administrative Units (LAUs) across 55 NUTS3 (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) regions in 11 countries had a suitability score above 16.

Bulgaria — three NUTS3 regions, 13 municipalities above threshold:

- **Varna** (4): Avren, Byala, Dolni chiflik, Varna
- **Dobrich** (3): Balchik, Kavarna, Shabla
- **Burgas** (6): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold

Denmark — Eight NUTS3 regions, 37 municipalities above threshold:

- **Byen København** (1): Tårnby
- **Nordsjælland** (3): Frederikssund, Halsnæs, Holbæk
- **Østsjælland** (2): Holbæk, Lejre
- **Vest-og Sydsjælland** (8): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Fyn** (6): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Syddjylland** (7): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Østjylland** (5): Horsens, Norddjurs, Odder, Randers, Syddjurs
- **Nordjylland** (5): Aalborg, Jammerbugt, Læsø, Mariagerfjord, Randers

Estonia — 1 NUTS3 region, six municipalities above threshold:

- **Lääne-Eesti** (6): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold

Finland — Eight NUTS3 regions, 23 municipalities above threshold:

- **Pohjanmaa** (1): Vörå
- **Helsinki-Uusimaa** (2): Lovisa, Raseborg
- **Varsinais-Suomi** (9): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Etelä-Karjala** (1): Villmanstrand
- **Kymenlaakso** (4): Fredrikshamn, Kotka, Pyttis, Vederlax
- **Keski-Pohjanmaa** (1): Karleby
- **Pohjois-Pohjanmaa** (1): Limingo
- **Åland** (4): Finström, Lemland, Saltvik, Sund

France — Six NUTS3 regions, 19 municipalities above threshold:

- **Loire-Atlantique** (2): Montoir-de-Bretagne, Saint-Brevin-les-Pins
- **Gironde** (8): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Landes** (1): Tarnos
- **Charente-Maritime** (5): Chenac-Saint-Seurin-d'Uzet, Le Château-d'Oléron, Le Verdon-sur-Mer, Royan, Talmont-sur-Gironde
- **Gard** (1): Le Grau-du-Roi
- **Bouches-du-Rhône** (2): Arles, Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer

Germany — 10 NUTS3 regions, 102 municipalities above threshold:

- **Landkreis Rostock** (2): Am Salzhaff, Rerik, Ostseebad, Stadt
- **Vorpommern-Rügen** (35): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Nordwestmecklenburg** (8): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Vorpommern-Greifswald** (33): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Flensburg, Kreisfreie Stadt** (1): Flensburg, Stadt
- **Kiel, Kreisfreie Stadt** (1): Kiel, Landeshauptstadt
- **Lübeck, Kreisfreie Stadt** (2): Dassow, Stadt, Lübeck, Hansestadt
- **Ostholstein** (9): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Rendsburg-Eckernförde** (4): Barkelsby, Eckernförde, Stadt, Strande, Waabs
- **Schleswig-Flensburg** (7): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold.

Netherlands — Two NUTS3 regions, 7 municipalities above threshold:

- **Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen** (3): Borsele, Hulst, Terneuzen
- **Overig Zeeland** (4): Hulst, Kapelle, Reimerswaal, Tholen

Norway — Five NUTS3 regions, 17 municipalities above threshold:

- **Oslo** (3): Bærum, Nesodden, Oslo
- **Østfold** (5): Fredrikstad, Halden, Hvaler, Sarpsborg, Strömstad
- **Akershus** (5): Asker, Bærum, Frogn, Nesodden, Nordre Follo
- **Agder** (1): Risør
- **Vestfold** (3): Færder, Holmestrand, Sandefjord

Poland — One NUTS3 region, nine municipalities above threshold:

- **Szczeciński** (9): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold

Romania — 2 NUTS3 regions, 12 municipalities above threshold:

- **Constanța** (8): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Tulcea** (4): Jurilovca, Murighiol, Oras Sulina, Sfantu Gheorghe

Sweden — Nine NUTS3 regions, 39 municipalities above threshold:

- **Stockholms län** (15): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold
- **Uppsala län** (1): Östhammar
- **Södermanlands län** (1): Trosa
- **Östergötlands län** (3): Norrköping, Söderköping, Valdemarsvik
- **Kalmar län** (4): Kalmar, Mönsterås, Oskarshamn, Västervik
- **Gotlands län** (1): Gotland
- **Skåne län** (3): Båstad, Höganäs, Lomma
- **Hallands län** (1): Kungsbacka
- **Västra Götalands län** (10): More than five municipalities have locations above the threshold

Countries are listed in alphabetical order; municipalities are listed only for areas (at NUTS3 level) with fewer than five affected municipalities. To explore the daily risk for individual municipalities and specific areas in greater detail, please refer to the [interactive Vibrio Viewer map tool](#).

*Note: high environmental suitability for *Vibrio* spp. is defined by a suitability index >16.

Background

Vibriosis is an infection caused by species of *Vibrio* bacteria, which occur naturally in coastal waters, particularly in warm, brackish environments where freshwater and seawater mix. Environmental conditions that favour bacterial growth include higher water temperatures and lower salinity [1]. In Europe, *Vibrio* bacteria are most frequently detected during the summer season. The Baltic Sea provides particularly favourable conditions because of its relatively low salinity, although *Vibrio* species are also found in the North Sea, the Black Sea and other coastal and estuarine bathing waters [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].

Human infection may occur through the consumption of raw or under-cooked seafood, particularly shellfish, or the exposure of open wounds to contaminated water. Clinical manifestations range from self-limiting gastroenteritis to wound infections, otitis, and severe invasive disease, including septicæmia and necrotising soft tissue infections. Individuals with underlying medical conditions, such as diabetes, chronic liver disease and immunosuppression, are at increased risk of severe illness [7, 8].

ECDC assessment

Climate-driven warming is expected to increase the suitability of coastal areas for bacterial growth. As sea surface temperatures continue to rise across parts of Europe, environmental conditions facilitating the potential for *Vibrio* proliferation and geographical expansion are becoming increasingly common [2, 9, 10].

Vibriosis remains relatively uncommon in the EU/EEA. However, locally acquired cases may occur during summer months, particularly in the presence of exceptionally high temperatures [11, 12].

To reduce the risk of *Vibrio* infections through food, it is recommended to ensure that seafood is cooked thoroughly before consumption. Individuals who have open wounds, recent piercings, cuts or scrapes are recommended to avoid swimming in brackish or coastal waters, or to cover the affected area with a waterproof dressing. In case of accidental contact with coastal water, the affected area should be disinfected and cleaned thoroughly.

Actions

ECDC monitors the environmental suitability for *Vibrio* spp. growth in coastal waters during the summer season. Regular updates are published in the [Vibrio Viewer](#) and the [Communicable Disease Threat Reports](#) to assess and communicate potential risks to human health across the EU/EEA.

ECDC publishes scientific information and advice on this topic on its dedicated webpage [Vibriosis](#).

Last time this event was included in the Weekly CDTR: 3 July 2026.

7. Expert deployment

Overview

Since 19 May 2026, the EU Health Task Force (EUHTF) has been supporting preparedness and response efforts related to the Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda.

Five ECDC experts have been deployed on a rotational basis to support Africa CDC, initially at its headquarters in Addis Ababa and, since 23 June 2026, within the Continental Incident Management Support Team (IMST) in Uganda. The deployments are part of the project 'Health Security and One Health in Africa - Africa CDC' in partnership with ECDC and EFSA (PHASE II), funded by the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA). The experts have provided support for surveillance and liaison activities.

Between 15 and 22 June 2026, the EUHTF deployed a team of three ECDC experts and two Member State experts to Kinshasa (DRC) and Kampala (Uganda), to conduct a Point of Entry fact-finding mission with a view to evaluating the implementation and operational performance of exit screening procedures.

Between 16 June and 8 July 2026, an ECDC Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) expert was deployed to the WHO country office in Juba, South Sudan, in response to a Global Outbreak Alert and Responses Network (GOARN) request for assistance. The expert supported the implementation of the country's RCCE field plan, strengthen community engagement and address the priority risk communication and community engagement gaps in the high-risk areas.

These activities are being conducted in close coordination with national authorities and the EU delegations, and in collaboration with the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) and DG INTPA.

Last time this event was included in the Weekly CDTR: 3 July 2026.

Events under active monitoring

- Cholera – Multi-country (World) – Monitoring global outbreaks – Monthly update - last reported on 26 June 2026
- Dengue – Multi-country (World) – Monitoring global outbreaks – Monthly update - last reported on 26 June 2026
- Mpox in the EU/EEA, Western Balkans and Türkiye – 2026 - last reported on 26 June 2026
- Mpox due to monkeypox virus clades I and II – Global outbreak – 2024–2026 - last reported on 26 June 2026
- Dengue cases – EU/EEA ex. Maldives – 2025–2026 - last reported on 26 June 2026
- Travel-associated chikungunya virus disease in EU/EEA countries imported from Seychelles - last reported on 26 June 2026
- Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus – Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda – 2026 - last reported on 10 July 2026
- Expert deployment - last reported on 10 July 2026
- Seasonal surveillance of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever - 2026 (Weekly report) - last reported on 10 July 2026
- Seasonal surveillance of West Nile Virus infections – 2026 (Weekly report) - last reported on 10 July 2026
- Seasonal monitoring of environmental suitability for *Vibrio* spp. risk in coastal waters - Bathing season 2026 - last reported on 10 July 2026
- Overview of respiratory virus epidemiology in the EU/EEA, week 27, 2026 - last reported on 10 July 2026
- Avian influenza A(H9N2) – Multi-country (World) – Monitoring human cases - last reported on 10 July 2026
- SARS-CoV-2 variant classification - last reported on 3 July 2026
- Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) – Multi-country – Monthly update - last reported on 3 July 2026
- Risk assessments under production - last reported on 3 July 2026.